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  India has shown remarkable resilience as the world’s largest democracy, evidenced most 
recently by the successful conclusion of its 14
th general election, and the resulting peaceful 
transition of power from one ruling coalition to another. Despite several challenges over the last 
fifty years, India’s institutions have functioned reasonably well, maintaining order, and 
supporting some degree of economic development. While economic reforms have received 
considerable attention over the last decade and more, India’s governance institutions have also 
begun to attract renewed scrutiny.  
In particular, one can argue that economic liberalization and market-oriented reform are 
only part of the reform agenda for countries like India. While reducing the role of government in 
certain economic activities can promote efficiency and growth, it is also critical that the 
government do better in areas where it has a key role, such as improving infrastructure and, even 
more importantly, basic human capabilities in areas such as health, nutrition and education. One 
can argue that inefficient delivery of government services has been a major reason for relative 
failure on the latter front, and that inadequacies in the workings of India’s federal system have, in 
turn, been important causes of inefficiency. 
All this motivates continued attention to India’s system of federal governance, and 
intergovernmental fiscal relations (IGFR) in particular. This paper provides an overview of some 
of the historical factors behind India’s system of IGFR, as well as its structural features and 
working in practice. It identifies some of the most important institutional developments and 
policy imperatives that face India’s system of IGFR. It concludes with a summary of lessons and 
challenges for this system. 
 
2. Origins and Context  
The origin of many of India’s federal institutions can be found in its history as a British 
colony. At the same time, the circumstances of independence, with its traumatic partition of the 
country, also played a major role in shaping the structure and working of the country’s 
intergovernmental relations. Different ideological positions and economic circumstances have 
affected overall federal institutions, which are briefly reviewed in this section.   
 
Historical Development 
  In the nineteenth century, the British gradually took over a subcontinent that had long 
since become politically fragmented and strife ridden.  Creeping extension of British rule 
crystallized with the Government of India Act, 1858, which imposed direct sovereignty under the 
British Crown, with an ad hoc mixture of centralized and decentralized administrative structures.  
  2Centralization was reflected in the power of the London-based Secretary of State for India, 
governing through the Viceroy, an Executive Council, and a small number of district level 
British administrators, who exercised all sovereign powers, with no separation of legislative, 
executive and judicial functions.  Decentralization was exemplified by the relationship of Indian 
princely states to the British administration, which retained considerable internal sovereignty. 
  As Crown rule was consolidated in the second half of the nineteenth century, the British 
attempted decentralization based on administrative considerations.  Municipal governments were 
introduced in the 1860s.  In some cases, sub-national units (“presidencies”) were split with 
administrative convenience in mind.  As a national political movement grew, the British 
developed their fiscal structures, motivated by an interplay of administrative and political 
considerations.  In 1858, the provincial governments depended completely on annual central 
allocations, since the center had authority over all revenue receipts and expenditures.  In 1870, 
some financial decentralization was begun as a prelude to meeting the perceived need for some 
local self-government. Initially, some expenditure categories (e.g., police, health, education) 
were assigned to the provincial governments, which received annual lump-sum grants, and had 
to have separate budgets.  Subsequently, further expenditure assignments were devolved to the 
provinces, along with some revenue authority and arrangements for revenue sharing.  
  After World War I, the British dealt with the rise of sub-nationalism and nationalism in a 
series of political and administrative responses, which included federal ideas to varying degrees. 
The 1918 Montagu-Chelmsford Report on constitutional reforms articulated a vision of India as 
a decentralized federation. The Government of India Act of 1919, based on the report, devolved 
some authority to the provinces, and nominally restricted the powers of the central government 
over matters assigned to the provinces.  While the Indian government remained essentially 
unitary, there was some relaxation of central control over provinces by separating the subjects of 
administration and sources of revenue into central and provincial jurisdictions.  Provinces 
received unambiguous control over sources of revenue such as land, irrigation and judicial 
stamps.  The initial assignment of revenue authority proposed would have required provincial 
contributions to fund the central government, but this scheme was quickly modified towards 
greater central fiscal autonomy, including the sharing of central income taxes with the provinces.   
  The Indian Statutory Commission of 1928, headed by Lord Simon, also included a 
review of India’s financial arrangements.  Sharing of the income tax between the center and the 
provinces was an important part of the new fiscal proposals.  Various innovations in taxation 
were also proposed.  Subsequently, several committees met to consider the new bases for 
revenue sharing, particularly the formulas for distributing income tax proceeds between the 
center and the various provinces. The beginning of the 1930s was marked by three conferences 
involving Indian leaders, on the future status of India’s governance.  These conferences, and the 
British government’s own deliberations, led to the 1935 Government of India Act, which 
proposed relatively loose federal structures that would build alliances and support their rule.  The 
1935 Act provided for the distribution of legislative jurisdictions with the three-fold division of 
powers into Federal, Provincial and Concurrent Lists. The legislature, however, did not have the 
features of a sovereign legislature, as its powers were subject to several limitations.   The Act 
also enabled the establishment of Federal Court to adjudicate the disputes between units of the 
federation and was also the Appellate Court to decide on constitutional questions.  On the fiscal 
front, the Act provided an assignment of tax authorities and a scheme of revenue sharing that, in 
many respects, laid the foundations of fiscal federalism in independent India.   
  3  The Second World War and the intensification of the Indian freedom movement overtook 
the implementation of the federal provisions of the 1935 Government of India Act.  Partition 
along with independence became more and more likely in this period. Nevertheless, the framers 
of the Indian Constitution, beginning in the Constituent Assembly in 1946, relied heavily on the 
1935 Act for the new constitutional framework.  However, the effect of the planned partition of 
the country strengthened the vision of a strong Center.  The more decentralized aspects of the 
federal structure of the 1935 Act were rejected after the chaos of partition. Two key individuals 
supported the more centralized vision for India: Jawaharlal Nehru, who became India’s first 
Prime Minister, and B.R. Ambedkar. Considerations of peacekeeping, coordination and a 
socialist economic vision all pushed Nehru toward centralization. Ambedkar, the Chairman of 
the Drafting Committee for the Constitution, had a strong preference for a unitary form of 
government.  His conception of federalism was shaped accordingly: a division of powers 
between center and states, but with residuary powers at the center, and central ability to impinge 
severely on the states in special circumstances. 
  Thus, the Indian Constitution incorporated centralizing features that were not in earlier 
British legislation, though closer to British practice in India.  Centralizing features included 
provisions for altering states or their boundaries, central supersession of state legislatures, and 
explicit restrictions on state powers. However, the Constitution did allow for states with elected 
governments and fiscal authority.  This basic fact has permitted Indian federalism to exist and 
continue. While the political structures envisaged in the 1935 Act were largely abandoned in the 
Constitution, the details of assignments of expenditure and revenue authorities, as well as of 
revenue sharing and grants were preserved.  Article 246 provides for a three-fold distribution of 
power, detailed in separate lists in the seventh schedule.  These enumerate the specific exclusive 
powers of the center and the states, and those powers that are concurrently held.  The three lists 
are long and close to exhaustive, though residuary powers are explicitly assigned to the center.1   
Many centralizing constitutional provisions, governing the relative authorities of the center 
and the states, have not been exercised because other methods have sufficed.  In particular, the 
center has been less concerned about explicit transfer of powers from the states to itself, or 
temporary suspension of state powers under constitutional provisions, because it has been able to 
exercise political control more directly through Article 356 of the Constitution.  This allows the 
Governor of a state to advise the President that the government of the state was unable to carry on 
“in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution”, and allows the President to assume “to 
himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the State”.  In practice, President’s rule 
means rule by the Prime Minister and the ruling party at the center, and has provided a direct means 
to exercise central political control, bypassing the electoral will of the people as expressed at the 
state level. 
                                                 
1 Another centralizing provision is Article 249, which empowers the upper house of parliament to transfer 
legislative jurisdiction from the states to the center.  While the conditions for doing so are necessity or expediency in 
the national interest, the transfer requires only a two-thirds majority of members present and voting.  In any case, 
Article 250 allows the central legislature to make laws with respect to matters in the state list.  Furthermore, Article 
353 (b) authorizes Parliament to make laws on matters not explicitly in the Union list.  Finally, Article 354 
empowers the President to order the suspension of the provisions of Articles 268 to 279 relating to transfers of 
revenues from the center to the states during a proclaimed emergency.  However, all these centralizing features have 
not been availed of anywhere near to the extent that they might have been in 50 years of the Constitution’s 
existence.   
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Political and Administrative Structures 
India has been a constitutional democracy since 1950, now comprised of 28 states, six 
“Union Territories” (UTs) and a National Capital Territory (NCT), Delhi (see Table 1). The NCT 
and the UT of Pondicherry have their own elected legislatures, whereas the other UTs are 
governed directly by appointees of the center. All the states have elected legislatures, with Chief 
Ministers in the executive role. Each state also has a Governor, nominally appointed by the 
President, but effectively an agent of the Prime Minister. The primary expression of statutory 
constitutional authority in India comes through the directly elected parliamentary-style 
governments at the national and state level, as well as nascent directly elected government bodies 
at various local levels.2  
Overlapping political authorities at the central and state levels have been dealt with 
through intra-party bargaining, and, more recently, through explicit bargaining and discussion. 
The Inter-State Council (ISC) was created in 1990,3 and has become a forum where some 
political and economic issues of joint concern can be collectively discussed and possibly 
resolved. The ISC includes the Prime Minister, state Chief Ministers, and several central cabinet 
ministers as members. While the ISC is merely advisory, it has formalized collective discussion 
and approval of several important matters impinging on India’s federal arrangements, including 
tax sharing and inter-state water disputes. Another, similar, body is older than the ISC, but 
narrower in scope. The National Development Council (NDC) serves as a forum for bargaining 
over five year plan allocations.4  
Political and economic centralization have also been reflected in bureaucratic and judicial 
institutions. The Indian bureaucracy is provided constitutional recognition.  The central and state 
level tiers of the “public services” are given shape through the provisions of Part XIV of the 
Constitution. Since each political layer of government requires its own administrative apparatus, 
any bureaucracy in a federation will have a federal character.  In particular, state governments 
must be able to appoint and dismiss5 bureaucrats to implement state-level policies. This is 
certainly the case in India, where there is a central bureaucracy as well as an independent 
bureaucracy in each state. However, the key component of the bureaucracy is the Indian 
Administrative Service (IAS), whose members are chosen by a centralized process, trained 
together, and then assigned to particular states. This structure was designed as a compromise 
between the desire to have an effective apparatus at the state level, and the fear of promoting 
                                                 
2 These are all single constituency first-past-the-post elections, but with some seats reserved for disadvantaged 
groups, such as Scheduled Castes (erstwhile “untouchables”) at each level. 
3 As early as the 1950s, the Second and Third Finance Commissions (see later) recommended an independent 
commission to re-examine central-state relations including an integrated examination of expenditures and non-
financial as well as financial relations.  The government was slow to act on this, though a commission was set up, 
and its report in 1987 led to the formation of the ISC. Meanwhile, India had gone through political developments 
and upheavals that posed new challenges.  Many of these issues are still being discussed, in particular through a 
recent Constitutional Review Commission.  
4 The NDC is chaired by the Prime Minister, and its members include all cabinet ministers at the center, Chief 
Ministers of the states, and members of the Planning Commission (see later). 
5 In practice, dismissal is almost impossible, something that is true for the entire organized sector in India. However, 
state governments use (and misuse) the power to transfer bureaucrats to assert political control over the bureaucracy. 
  5regional loyalties over national ones. This compromise has been problematic, since conflicts 
arise between state and central politicians (the latter acting through IAS members assigned to the 
central government) in directing state-level IAS bureaucrats. 
 At the national and state levels, the judiciary constitutes a distinct branch of government, 
though the legislative branch influences appointments.  At the local level, IAS members are 
vested with some judicial authority. The Supreme Court stands at the top of the Indian judicial 
hierarchy.  The President, in consultation with the Prime Minister, appoints its Justices. Its 
powers include broad original and appellate jurisdiction and the right to pass on the 
constitutionality of laws passed by Parliament.  In practice, there has been conflict between the 
Supreme Court and the legislature/executive over the scope of these powers, and their boundaries 
remain subject to contestation. However, when specific issues of center-state relations have 
emerged with respect to taxation and property rights, to be adjudicated by the Supreme Court, 
the basic centralizing bias of the Constitution tilted the interpretation of the Court in favor of the 
center. At the state level, below the Supreme Court, are the High Courts.  Each High Court’s 
justices are appointed by the President, in consultation with the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court and the state’s Governor.  Paralleling the situation at the Center, the state’s Chief Minister 
is in a position to influence the Governor's advice.  High courts also have both original and 
appellate jurisdiction.  In addition, they superintend the work of all courts within the state, 
including district courts, as well as various courts subordinate to the district courts.    
 
3. IGFR Features 
India has developed explicit as well as implicit channels for managing intergovernmental 
fiscal relations, and for making vertical transfers, particularly from the center to the states and 
UTs. This section reviews constitutional tax and expenditure assignments, the role of the Finance 
Commissions, Planning Commission, and central ministries in making intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers, and the nature and associated problems of subnational borrowing. It will be seen that 
India’s intergovernmental fiscal transfer system is complicated by the existence of multiple 
channels, particularly the Planning Commission, which is charged with drawing up and 
implementing five-year economic development plans. Furthermore, while the bulk of transfers 
are general-purpose formulaic transfers, there is also a complex mix of specific purpose 
transfers, sometimes with ad hoc matching requirements, and often determined through political 
bargaining. 
 
Expenditure and Tax Assignments  
The Indian Constitution, in its Seventh Schedule, assigns the powers and functions of the 
center and the states. The schedule specifies the exclusive powers of the center in the Union list; 
exclusive powers of the states in the State list; and those falling under the joint jurisdiction are 
placed in the Concurrent list (see Table 2).  All residuary powers are assigned to the center.  The 
nature of the assignment of expenditure functions is fairly typical of federal nations, and broadly 
fits with economists’ theoretical rationale.6  The functions of the central government are those 
                                                 
6 Economic theories of government are based on the idea that public (non-rival and non-exclusive) goods are not 
well provided by the market mechanism.  In addition, if governments are not perfectly informed and intrinsically 
  6required to maintain macroeconomic stability, international trade and relations, and those having 
implications for more than one state.  The major subjects assigned to the states comprise public 
order, public health, agriculture, irrigation, land rights, fisheries and industries and minor 
minerals. The States also assume a significant role for subjects in the concurrent list, such as 
education and transportation, social security and social insurance.  
The assignment of tax powers in India is based on a principle of separation, i.e., tax 
categories are exclusively assigned either to the center or to the states (see Table 3).  Most broad-
based (in principle though not in practice) taxes have been assigned to the center, including taxes 
on income and wealth from non-agricultural sources, corporation tax, taxes on production 
(excluding those on alcoholic liquors) and customs duty. A long list of taxes is assigned to the 
states.  However, only the tax on the sale and purchase of goods has been significant for state 
revenues.  This narrow effective tax base is largely a result of political economy factors that have 
eroded or prevented the use of taxes on agricultural land or incomes by state governments. The 
center has also been assigned all residual powers, so that taxes not mentioned in any of the lists 
automatically fall into its domain. 
The tax assignment system has some problematic features.  The separation of income tax 
powers between the center and states based on whether the source of income is agriculture or 
non-agriculture has opened up avenues for both avoidance and evasion of the personal income 
tax.  Second, even though in a legal sense taxes on production (central manufacturing excises) 
and sale (state sales taxes) are separate, they tax the same base, causing overlapping and leaving 
less tax room to the latter. Finally, the states are allowed to levy taxes on the sale and purchase of 
goods (entry 54 in the State list) but not services.  This, besides providing avenues for tax 
evasion and avoidance, has also posed problems in designing and implementing a comprehensive 
value added tax (VAT).  
The realized outcome of the Indian assignments of tax and expenditure authority, their 
particular history of implementation, and the response of different levels of government and tax 
payers to the assignment has been a substantial vertical fiscal imbalance. In 2002-2003, the states 
on average raised about 38 percent of government revenues, but incurred about 58 percent of 
expenditures.  Transfers from the center made up the balance – though perverse fiscal incentives 
for the states in this system have, in fact, increased the imbalance. In fact, the ability of the states 
to finance their current expenditures from their own sources of revenue has seen a long-run 
                                                                                                                                                             
benevolent, subnational governments may be better able to judge the desired levels of local public goods, and, 
potentially, can be given more specific electoral incentives to do so than national governments.  The assignment of 
expenditure responsibilities then follows:  wherever economies of scale, access to resources, and externalities or 
spillovers do not indicate otherwise, the expenditure assignment should match the locus of beneficiaries. With 
respect to revenue authority, tax assignments are what chiefly matter (borrowing is secondary).  Since mobility 
across jurisdictions within a federation is greater than mobility across nations, leading to a shrinking base in 
response to a tax, it is harder for subnational jurisdictions to raise revenue from taxes than for the central 
government. However, mobility also depends on the relative benefits provided through public expenditures, so that 
jurisdictions are able to counter mobility in response to marginal taxes by also providing appropriate benefits at the 
margin to those who are taxed. If mobility of tax bases implies that more taxes should be collected by the center, 
there may be a mismatch between revenues and expenditures for subnational jurisdictions. Redistribution motives 
and collection efficiency may also favor centralized assignment of taxes. The result of the differing determinants of 
optimal assignments of expenditure and tax authorities can be a “vertical fiscal imbalance”, where subnational 
governments rely on the center for revenue transfers.  However, the divergence of revenue and expenditure 
decisions at the margin can have adverse incentive effects.  
  7decline, from 69 percent in 1955-1956 to 52 percent in 2002-2003. In terms of total expenditure 
(including capital spending), the states were even more dependent on the center, with only 42 
percent of their overall spending being covered by their own revenue receipts in 2000-01.7 
 
Finance Commission Transfers 
The Constitution recognized that its assignment of tax powers and expenditure functions 
would create imbalances between expenditure ‘needs’ and abilities to raise revenue. The 
imbalances could be both vertical, among different levels of government, and horizontal, among 
different units within a sub-central level.  Therefore, the Constitution originally provided for the 
sharing of the proceeds of certain centrally levied taxes (e.g., non-corporate income tax, Article 
270; and Union excise duty, Article 272) with the states, as well as grants to the states from the 
Consolidated Fund of India.  Recent constitutional changes in this scheme have simplified this 
sharing arrangement, replacing it with an overall share of the Consolidated Fund.  The shares of 
the center and the states, and their allocation among different states are determined by the 
Finance Commission, which is also a constitutional creation,8 and is appointed by the President 
of India every five years (or earlier if needed). In addition to tax devolution, the Finance 
Commission is also required to recommend grants to the states in need of assistance under 
Article 275. Finance Commission transfers are, thus, all unconditional in nature. 
The Finance Commissions’ approach to federal transfers has consisted of (i) assessment 
of overall budgetary requirements of the center and states to determine the volume of resources 
available for transfer with the center during the period of recommendation, (ii) projecting of 
states’ own revenues and non-plan current expenditures, (iii) determining and distributing the 
states’ share of the consolidated fund of the center, and (iv) filling gaps between projected 
expenditures and revenues after tax devolution with grants.   
Over the last fifty years eleven Finance Commissions have made recommendations to the 
central government and, barring a few exceptions, these have been accepted. In this process, the 
Commissions have developed an elaborate methodology for dealing with horizontal as well as 
vertical fiscal imbalances. In particular, the formula for tax devolution is quite complicated, as a 
result of attempts to capture simultaneously disparate (and even contradictory) factors such as 
poverty, ‘backwardness’, tax effort, fiscal discipline, and population control efforts (see Table 4). 
The result has been that the impact of Finance Commission transfers on horizontal equity 
(equalizing fiscal capacity across states) has been somewhat limited (see Table 5).9 Despite the 
ad hoc nature of the tax-sharing formula, its persistence reflects the nature of precedent that has 
                                                 
7 These figures are from various RBI Annual Reports, available at http://www.rbi.org.in/. 
8 At the time of independence, revenue sharing between the center and the states was governed by the 1935 Act.  In 
1947, some adjustments were made in the allocation percentages across provinces as a result of partition.  When 
drafting the Constitution, the Constituent Assembly appointed an expert committee to advise on the financial 
provisions of the new document.  This committee made some specific recommendations on what revenue pools 
should be shared between center and states, as well as percentages for some of these categories.  Most importantly, 
the expert committee recommended the creation of an independent Finance Commission to deal periodically with 
center-state revenue sharing.  The Constitution incorporated this latter recommendation, but left it to the new 
Finance Commission to recommend specific sharing percentages.  
9 The exception is the so-called ‘special category’ states, as can be seen from Table 5. These are hilly states on 
India’s borders, with strategic importance as well as cost disabilities. 
  8grown around the Finance Commission, even though it is not a permanent body, and lacks 
continuity in its staffing and its analysis. 
Grants recommended by the Finance Commissions have typically been determined on the 
basis of projected gaps between non-plan current expenditures and post-tax devolution revenues. 
As with tax sharing, these grants have generally been unconditional, although some of the 
Commissions (particularly after the Sixth) also attempted to enhance outlays on specified 
services in the states by making closed-ended specific purpose non-matching grants.  In either 
case, however, the incentive problems with this “gap-filling” approach are obvious. Some of the 
Commissions did attempt to take account of normative growth rates of revenues and 
expenditures in projections, but these attempts were selective and relatively unimportant. Table 6 
provides statistics on the relative magnitudes of tax sharing and grants in the Finance 
Commission’s transfers.  
Despite the Finance Commissions’ success in establishing guidelines and stability for 
center-state tax sharing, their methodology and processes have been criticized.  The main 
criticisms are (i) the scope of the Finance Commissions through the Presidential terms of 
reference has been too restricted; and (ii) the design of their transfer schemes has reduced state 
government incentives for fiscal discipline (through ‘gap-filling’ transfers), while doing 
relatively little to reduce inter-state inequities.10 Therefore one can argue that there is still an 
opportunity to improve this aspect of India’s IGFR system. 
 
Planning Commission 
While the Finance Commission decides on tax shares and makes grants, a separate body, 
the Planning Commission,11 makes grants and loans (in the ratio 30:70 for the major states) for 
implementing development plans.12  Historically, as development planning gained emphasis, the 
Planning Commission became a major dispenser of such funds to the states.  As there is no 
specific provision in the Constitution for such plan transfers, the central government channeled 
them under the miscellaneous, and ostensibly limited provisions of Article 282.  Before 1969, 
plan transfers were project-based. Since then, the distribution has been done on the basis of a 
consensus formula decided by the NDC (see Table 7). As in the case of the Finance Commission 
formula, the Planning Commission also tries to aggregate extremely disparate objectives in its 
calculations, with the result that the overall impact is less than clear. One major contrast with the 
Finance Commission is the conditional nature of Planning Commission transfers. However, 
while the special category states receive plan transfers based on projects that they formulate and 
submit, the general category states’ plan transfers are not related to the required size or 
composition of plan investments. Hence there is not even implicit matching of states’ own 
resources in this channel, let alone an explicit matching formula. 
                                                 
10 Note that both larger government deficits at the subnational level and, to some extent, increases in inter-state 
inequalities in the last decade, can be seen as partly endogenous to the functioning of India’s intergovernmental 
transfer system. 
11 While there was no specific constitutional provision for a planning apparatus, the ideology of Nehru and many 
associates led to the formation of a Planning Commission through a resolution of the Cabinet.  The Prime Minister 
has always chaired the Planning Commission, but even then, it has not always succeeded well in coordinating with 
or among the various ministries, as well as complicating the work of the Finance Commissions. 
12 The special category states receive a much higher proportion of Plan funds as grants. 
  9The process for determining plan transfers is as follows. The Planning Commission 
works out five-year-plan investments for each sector of the economy and each state.  With this as 
background, the states work out their respective annual plans for each year, based on estimated 
resource availability, which potentially includes the balance from current revenue (including 
Finance Commission transfers), contributions of public enterprises, additional resource 
mobilization, plan grants and loans, market borrowings, and other miscellaneous capital receipts. 
At this stage, a certain amount of bargaining for resources goes on through the NDC as well as in 
state-by-state discussions, to determine plan loans and grants. At the end of this process, the 
Planning Commission approves the state plans. Thus, at the margin, it is mainly the own resource 
position of the states that determines their plan sizes.  
While there is no disincentive effect in this approach, neither is there a clear process of 
evaluating investment needs and priorities. A lack of coordination between the Finance and 
Planning Commissions, together with fungibility of transfers, further complicates the impact of 
these intergovernmental transfers. Table 6 reports the amount of plan transfers (grants only): the 
transfers discussed so far are in the category of ‘state plan grants’. Hence, one can see that these 
plan transfers are only about one-third to one-quarter of Finance Commission transfers in 
magnitude. Nevertheless, they represent an important source of revenue for the states. Most 
recently, reflecting their deteriorating fiscal positions, some states have been using plan transfers 
for meeting current salary obligations, illustrating the problems of the system. 
 
Central Ministry Transfers 
Finally, various ministries give grants to their counterparts in the states for specified 
projects, either wholly funded by the center (central sector projects) or requiring the states to 
share a proportion of the cost (centrally sponsored schemes). Both these categories are reported 
together as central schemes Table 6). The ostensible rationale for these programs is financing 
activities with a high degree of inter-state spillovers, or which are merit goods (e.g., poverty 
alleviation and family planning), but they are often driven by pork-barrel objectives.13 These 
projects are supposed to be monitored by the Planning Commission, and coordinated with the 
overall state plans – which is why they are typically listed under Plan transfers in Table 6 – but 
both monitoring and coordination are relatively ineffective.  
There are over 100 such schemes, and several attempts in the past to consolidate them 
into broad sectoral programs have not been successful. These programs have provided the central 
government with an instrument to actively influence states’ spending, replacing the pre-1969 
plan transfers in this role. The proliferation of schemes may also have increased the size and 
control of the bureaucracy.  While the NDC recently appointed an investigative committee that 
recommended scaling down and consolidating centrally sponsored schemes, implementation of 
this objective was weak. 
While the specific purposes and matching requirements of central and centrally 
sponsored schemes make them potentially an important channel for dealing with spillovers, as 
noted, the implementation of these schemes has been problematic, with the issues including lack 
of transparency, poor selection of projects, and ineffective monitoring. Nevertheless, the 
                                                 
13 For example, they can be for very specific local projects, and can have conditionalities such as employment 
requirements. 
  10discretionary aspect of these intergovernmental transfers has made them attractive to central 
ministries, and, as can be seen from Table 5, their relative importance in overall transfers has 
increased. 
 
Loans and Guarantees 
In addition to explicit transfers, intergovernmental loans, to the extent that they are 
subsidized, also constitute implicit transfers to subnational governments. Ideally, borrowing 
should be to finance investment, but state governments have increasingly used borrowing to meet 
current expenditure needs (now approaching 50 percent). State governments can only borrow 
from the market with central government approval if they are indebted to the center, and this 
constraint binds for all the states. Central loans now constitute about 60 percent of the states’ 
indebtedness, with another 22 percent being market borrowing, and the remainder made up of 
pension funds, shares of rural small savings, and required holdings of state government bonds by 
commercial banks (Rao and Singh, 2002; Srinivasan, 2002). While these captive sources of 
finance are limited, the states have been able to soften their budget constraints further by off-
budget borrowing or nonpayment by their public sector enterprises (PSEs). For example, the 
State Electricity Boards (SEBs) have been tardy in paying the National Thermal Power 
Corporation, a central PSE (Srinivasan, 2002). 
Other sources of softness in state government budget constraints include central 
government guarantees of loans made to state government PSEs by external agencies, and central 
forgiveness of past loans made to state governments, presumably to gain political advantage. 
Even in the case of attempts to impose conditions on state borrowing that would encourage fiscal 
reforms, the center has not been able to harden budget constraints. In particular, in 1999-2000, 
eleven states signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with the center, promising fiscal 
reforms in exchange for ways and means advances (essentially, overdrafts) on tax devolution and 
grants due to them. In some cases, however, the center has had to convert these advances into 
three-year loans. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) reports stopping payments to three states 
(Reserve Bank of India, 2001), but the political difficulty of not bailing out states that are both 
poor and populous is obvious.14  
In the 1990s, India has struggled with high fiscal deficits and the states have contributed 
significantly to this problem after 1997-98. Several states have also followed the center’s lead in 
passing Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Acts to set targets for deficit reduction, 
and recently the Ministry of Finance has released a report outlining a roadmap for achieving 
deficit reduction targets. In addition to reforms in tax and transfer systems as ways of reducing 
subnational fiscal deficits, an important area of reform relates to the process of borrowing by the 
states, which has hitherto been ad hoc and opaque. Improvements in financial information, 
budgeting practices, regulatory norms and monitoring are all required here, as well as changes in 
the institutional rules (IMF, 2003; Hausmann and Purfield, 2004). These reforms parallel many 
of those required for the financial sector as a whole: state governments just happen to be among 
the most powerful among those taking advantage of poorly functioning credit markets to run up 
unpaid debts. Some reform is already taking place, including statutory or administrative 
                                                 
14 These kinds of political considerations also constrain the center to make plan loans at the same interest rate to all 
states, removing that marginal incentive device as well.  
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market-based borrowing mechanisms such as auctions conducted by the RBI.  
  Another approach to the states’ indebtedness and continued high fiscal deficits has been 
to tie some portion of intergovernmental transfers to state-level fiscal reforms. The Eleventh 
Finance Commission worked out a scheme by pooling 15 per cent of revenue deficit grants and 
adding an equal amount to it to create an incentive fund to be allocated among the states based on 
fulfillment of targets of growth of tax and non-tax revenues and expenditures on salaries, interest 
payments and subsidies, as set in the fiscal restructuring plan detailed by the Commission.  The 
incentive fund has been allocated to the states according to their population shares.  A state will get 
its full amount if it fulfils the specified targets of the monitorable measure (revenue deficit as a 
percentage of total revenue receipts of the states) evolved for the purpose, with graduated rewards 
for partial fulfillment. However, the potential problems with this scheme include the relatively small 
size of the incentive fund, biases in the monitorable measure against smaller and poorer states, 
conflicts with other fiscal incentive programs, and opportunities for moving deficits off budget to 
manipulate the program outcomes.15 One might also simply argue that India’s intergovernmental 
transfer system is already complex and overburdened with multiple objectives: this theme is 
reprised in the next section. 
 
4. Institutional Developments and Policy Imperatives  
  Several institutional developments and policy imperatives stand out in a review of India’s 
IGFR system, and represent new opportunities and challenges. India has taken major strides in 
decentralizing government by creating a tier of local government that has constitutional status, 
and that requires another layer of intergovernmental transfers. At the same time, market-oriented 
economic reforms have weakened traditional hierarchical mechanisms of fiscal control, and 
require new institutional approaches, including reforms in several areas, particularly in the tax 
system. In this new era of redefining boundaries between government and market, regional 
inequalities remain a major concern. 
   
Local Government  
  The status and powers of local government in India ebbed and rose throughout the 
colonial period.  The Government of India Act of 1919 marked the first serious devolution to the 
local level, with chairmen of district boards (previously provincial officials) becoming elected 
officials, and municipalities and district and local boards increasing the scale of their activities, 
though still with relatively narrow expenditure assignments.  However, local governments were 
reluctant to tax, or enforce collections, and revenues came primarily from provincial transfers.  
While municipalities used octroi (a local entry tax on goods) and personal income taxes, rural 
                                                 
15 Another problem is a specific characteristic of recent political equations, where a coalition government at the 
national level gave pivotal status to ruling parties in some states, which then exercised their bargaining power with 
the national ruling coalition to soften their budget constraints. Hence, even ostensibly positive developments such as 
tying some portion of center-state transfers to implementation of economic reform can be distorted by political 
considerations. 
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Land revenue still represented the major source of provincial revenue, and served as a substitute 
for an agricultural income tax. 
  The 1935 Act (see Section 2) did not have much impact on local government 
structures.  Typical local responsibilities, such as health and education, received little attention.  
World War II increased centralization of government, and it was only Mahatma Gandhi who 
continued to press for decentralization to the local government level. Gandhi’s perspective 
received some acknowledgement in the Constitution’s Directive Principles, but little more until 
the 1980s, when a few states shifted the emphasis in formulating and implementing economic 
plans from bureaucratic to political control, and generally strengthened rural local government. 
In 1988, a central committee recommended that Panchayati Raj16 bodies should be given 
constitutional status.  In 1991, two separate constitutional amendment bills were introduced, 
covering panchayats and municipalities respectively.  These were brought into force as the 73rd 
and 74th amendments to the Constitution of India in 1993. 
A key change brought about by the amendments was a reduction of state government 
discretion concerning elections to rural local government bodies.  Direct elections to local bodies 
must be held every five years.  Hence “voice” replaces “hierarchy” as the primary accountability 
mechanism (Hirschman, 1970; Rao and Singh, 2001).  This is a positive step to the extent that it 
provides more refined incentives, subject to the caveat of effective monitoring and transparency 
being achievable.  Local government reform also has changed the nature of tax and expenditure 
assignments to local governments,17 and instituted a system of formal state-local transfers 
modeled on the component of the existing center-state system that is governed by the Finance 
Commission.  While there are some serious issues with the new assignments, including problems 
of local capacity and efficiency of raising and spending money, we focus here on the new 
transfer system. 
  One view has been that formal transfers from the center and states to local governments 
have the potential to accentuate fiscal deficit problems.  Alternatively, a formal, rule-governed 
system will make existing problems more transparent.  In fact, the evidence suggests that this is 
the case.  It is now apparent that local government finances, particularly for urban bodies, 
steadily worsened over the period before local government reform, under a system of 
hierarchical control and supposedly strict monitoring by state governments.  The new State 
Finance Commissions (SFCs) have struggled to formulate the principles for sharing or assigning 
state taxes, tolls, and fees and for making grants-in-aid. There remains considerable variation in 
the quality of analysis, methodologies used, and implementation of transfers across the different 
states. Lack of political will at the state level and the states’ own fiscal problems have both 
restricted progress in this dimension. On the other hand the current situation with respect to local 
governments seems no worse than the previous one of ad hoc and discretionary transfers and 
                                                 
16 This term translates as ‘rule of panchayats’, the latter referring to traditional village ruling councils of five 
members, and now applied to any rural local government. In fact, there are three nested levels of rural local 
government, covering, in order of decreasing size, the district, block, and village or village group. 
17 For example, the 73rd Amendment created a list of 29 different areas of rural local government functional 
responsibility, considerably broader in scope than the previous situation, though the majority of these remain 
concurrent responsibilities with the state government.   
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within which local governments may become effective over time. 
After the last election, in May 2004, the new government at the center proposed 
transferring money directly to local governments. In the past, the states have received 
unconditional Finance Commission transfers earmarked for local governments, but have retained 
control of these monies. They have also controlled Planning Commission and central ministry 
conditional transfers that have ostensibly been targeted at district or block level rural government 
authorities. With local governments now enjoying constitutional status, the states are reluctant to 
permit new transfers direct to rural local governments, and they have opposed the center’s 
proposals, fearing that they will lead to reductions in their own transfer receipts. One way out of 
this impasse may be for states to give local governments greater effective taxing powers, and to 
improve their collection capabilities. 
 
Regional Inequalities and IGFR 
The evidence from several studies suggests growing inequality among the Indian states in 
the past three decades, with the rate increasing in the 1990s.18  Differences in infrastructure and 
institutions that seem to explain interstate differences have been persistent, and neither Finance 
Commission transfers, Planning Commission transfers, nor central ministry transfers have made 
a substantial dent in regional inequalities in India. Growing regional inequality is a concern, 
particularly because it can threaten political stability. Liberalization has meant a reduction in 
central government control of industrial investment and other aspects of regional economic 
policy, leaving the intergovernmental transfer system in the spotlight. 
What are possible reforms that can be made in the transfer system, if growing regional 
disparities are a concern, and can they be politically feasible?  One example of the political 
feasibility in the process of institutional reform comes from the case of tax-sharing arrangements.  
The Constitution specified certain categories of centrally collected taxes that were to be shared 
with the states, according to criteria to be determined by the Finance Commission.  In particular, 
personal income taxes were a major component of tax transfers from the center to the states, 
which received 87.5 percent of such tax revenues.  However, income tax surcharges were kept 
entirely by the center.  Academic commentators suggested that there were obvious incentive 
problems with such arrangements, and the Tenth Finance Commission recommended alternative 
arrangements whereby a proportion of overall central tax revenues would be devolved to the 
states.  This required bargaining and agreement among the center and the states, as well as a 
constitutional amendment, but this was all accomplished by 2000. 
There is a case for the Finance Commission and Planning Commission overhauling their 
transfer formulae completely, to achieve greater simplicity. Such reforms would not solve 
problems of increasing inter-state inequalities, since the variation in SDP per capita is far greater 
than the level of per capita transfers. However, they would make the formal transfer system 
clearer and simpler, and make it easier to understand its objectives and its impacts. Removing a 
significant portion of center-state transfers outside the political economy arena, clearly targeting 
them toward horizontal equity objectives,19 and doing so in a manner that does not create 
                                                 
18 See Rao and Singh (2004a) for a summary of these studies. 
19 This is not achieved in the current system, as Table 5 illustrates. 
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the idea of using the intergovernmental transfer system to provide very refined or targeted 
incentives to meet general fiscal balance goals, but we would argue that is most appropriate for 
the bulk of intergovernmental transfers. 
  
Internal Common Market and Tax Reform 
  Theories of Market Preserving Federalism (e.g., Weingast, 1993) emphasize the positive 
role of a common internal market.  In the United States, this idea was incorporated in the 
Interstate Commerce Clause, which eventually received strong support from the Supreme Court. 
The framers of the Indian Constitution, although aware of the need to ensure a common market 
in the federation, were not averse to the idea of placing restrictions if the situation so demanded.  
Article 301 of the Constitution states, “Subject to the other provisions of this part, trade, 
commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free”.  At the same time, 
Article 302 empowers Parliament to impose restrictions on this in “public interest”. An important 
fiscal impediment to free inter-state trade is the levy of inter-state sales tax.  The tax is levied by 
the exporting state on inter-state sale of goods.  The framers of the Constitution intended that the 
sales tax system in India should be destination based.  According to Article 286 of the 
Constitution, “No law of a state shall impose, or authorise the imposition of the tax on the sale or 
purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place (a) outside the state, or (b) in the 
course of import of goods into, or export of goods out of, the territory of India.”  However, based 
on the recommendations of the Taxation Enquiry Commission of 1953, the Sixth amendment 
added clauses to enable the central government to levy taxes on inter-state transactions.   
Under these provisions, the central government authorized the states to levy a tax on 
inter-state sale subject to a specified ceiling rate.  Besides creating impediment to free movement 
of goods (through check-posts), this tax on export of goods from one state to another has 
converted the sales tax into an origin-based tax.  The tax has also has caused significant inter-
state exportation of the tax burden from the richer producing states to the residents of poorer 
consuming states (Rao and Singh, 1998).  Also, entry 52 in the State list empowers the States to 
levy tax on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale.  In many states, the 
tax has been assigned to the urban local bodies and the tax is variously called “octroi” or “entry 
tax”.  Thus, taxes are levied not only on exports from one state to another but also on all imports 
into local areas including imports from other states.  These taxes have complicated the tax 
system, created severe distortions, and caused severe impediments to inter-regional movement of 
goods.   
Evolving a coordinated consumption-tax system remains a major challenge (Rao, 2000). 
Rao provides detailed recommendations with respect to issues such as rates, interstate sales 
taxes, and tax administration for a dual VAT coordinated between the Center and the states, and 
notes the problem created by the failure of the Constitution to explicitly include services within 
the scope of states’ sales tax authority. Moving taxation of services from the Union list, where it 
implicitly lies through the Center’s residual powers over taxes not explicitly specified in the 
Constitution, to the Concurrent list will require a constitutional amendment.  Such an amendment 
must be proposed by the central government, but would benefit the states.  One can incorporate 
political economy considerations by tying such an amendment to persuading the states to reduce 
and eventually eliminate taxation of interstate sales.  This would remove some of the internal 
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smooth the implementation of a destination-based VAT for the states, which in turn could also 
reduce tax exporting by the richer states, complementing the role of transfers in keeping 
interstate divergence from becoming politically unacceptable. 
 
5.  Conclusion: Lessons and Challenges 
  We can summarize the lessons of this paper quite briefly. First, an understanding of 
historical forces and ideologies can be important in explaining the evolution of IGFR systems, as 
well as current structures. In particular, a historical perspective can help in realizing that the 
context has changed enough to require some institutional reform. In India, many features of its 
IGFR system were a product of colonial rule and the immediate post-independence environment. 
It can be argued that, over fifty years later, it is time for a major overhaul of India’s system of 
IGFR. 
  This paper has laid out some of the complexity of India’s IGFR system as it has evolved. 
A case can be made that greater simplicity, through reducing channels of intergovernmental 
transfers, as well as consolidating and simplifying formulae, will aid in achieving objectives of 
horizontal equity, as well as managing political challenges arising from increased regional 
inequality within the federation. Incentives for subnational fiscal discipline can also be built into 
the transfer system more effectively (“hard budget constraints”). While there will always be a 
role for political discretion, even its exercise can be made more efficient through more effective 
design of the transfer system.  
Furthermore, decentralization is not antithetical to fiscal discipline, as long as the transfer 
system has appropriate incentives built into it for local governments as well, and there is no 
reason this cannot be done. Effective decentralization seems critical to improving the efficiency 
of government delivery of local public goods and services, particularly those that improve human 
capabilities. Thus, improvements in India’s IGFR system must include reforming the system of 
tax and expenditure assignments, as well as the intergovernmental transfer system. Tax reforms 
go well beyond decentralizing tax authority more effectively in areas such as local property 
taxes, to a major overhaul of the system of indirect taxes to reduce economic distortions and 
increase tax efficiency. 
  Implementing systemic reforms in government is always a major challenge. Each of the 
areas we have discussed, taxation, intergovernmental transfers, fiscal deficits and 
decentralization, requires detailed policy formulation and implementation that must overcome 
inertia, resource constraints, and active opposition from vested interests. What is encouraging is 
that a considerable amount has been accomplished in the past decade, partly spurred by the 
acceleration of India’s economic growth. It will be interesting to see how recent political changes 
at the center and several important states shape the debate about reforming India’s governance in 
general, and its IGFR system in particular. 
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Some Characteristics of India’s States 
 
  Area 
(Sq.  Km) 




















High Income States  601800  194065  322.5  4065770  22461  18.31  18.90  28.74 
Gujarat 196000  50597  258.1  896060  18685  5.96  4.93  6.33 
Goa 3800  1344  353.7  58620  44613  0.12  0.13  0.41 
Haryana 44000  21083  479.2  424880  21551  1.34  2.05  3.00 
Maharashtra 308000  96752  314.1  2131510  22604  9.37  9.42  15.07 
Punjab 50000  24289  485.8  554700  23254  1.52  2.37  3.92 
Middle Income States  725000  302633  417.4  4867930  17635  22.05  29.47  34.41 
Andhra Pradesh  275000  75728  275.4  1117530  14878  8.36  7.37  7.90 
Karnataka 192000  52734  274.7  862980  16654  5.84  5.13  6.10 
Kerala 39000  31839  816.4  569260  17709  1.19  3.10  4.02 
Tamil Nadu  130000  62111  477.8  1143090  18623  3.95  6.05  8.08 
West Bengal  89000  80221  901.4  1175070  14874  2.71  7.81  8.31 
Low Income States  1409300  458682  325.5  4022290  9013  42.87  44.66  28.44 
Bihar  94000 82879 881.7 383260 4813  2.86  8.07  2.71 
Chhattisgarh 135100  20796  153.9  213310  10405  4.11  2.02  1.51 
Jharkhand  79700 26909 337.6 232270 9223  2.42  2.62  1.64 
Madhya Pradesh  308000  60385  196.1  677780  11626  9.37  5.88  4.79 
Orissa 156000  36707  235.3  311950  8733  4.75  3.57  2.21 
Rajasthan 342000  56473  165.1  710200  13046  10.40  5.50  5.02 
Uttaranchal 53500  8480  158.5  na  na  1.63  0.83  na 
Uttar Pradesh  241000  166053  689.0  1493520  9323  7.33  16.17  10.56 
General Category States  2736100  955380  349.2  12955990 14476  83.23  93.02  91.59 
Special Category States  540500  55182  102.1  639300  12339  16.44  5.37  4.52 
Arunachal  Pradesh  84000 1091  13.0 14270  13352 2.56  0.11  0.10 
Assam 78000  26638  341.5  2533300  9720  2.37  2.59  1.79 
Himachal Pradesh  56000  6077  108.5  106570  17786  1.70  0.59  0.75 
Jammu & Kashmir  222000  10070  45.4  121820  12373  6.75  0.98  0.86 
Manipur 22000  2389  108.6  28580  12721  0.67  0.23  0.20 
Meghalaya 23000  2306  100.3  29040  12063  0.70  0.22  0.21 
Mizoram  21000 891  42.4 12880  14909 0.64  0.09  0.09 
Nagaland 17000  1989  117.0  23300  12594  0.52  0.19  0.16 
Sikkim  7000 540 77.1 7580  14751  0.21 0.05 0.05 
Tripura 10500  3191  303.9  41930  13195  0.32  0.31  0.30 
All  States  3276600  1010562  308.4  13595290 14359 99.67 98.40 96.11 
UTs 10974  16453  1499.3  549870  31211  0.33  1.60  3.89 
Total  3287574  1027015 312.4  14145160 13778 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Notes: na – Not Available.  All State NSDP figure does not include SDP from Uttaranchal. NSDP figure of UTs 
excludes SDP from Dadra & Nagar Haveli, Daman and Dieu and Lakshadweep. 
Source: Rao and Singh (2004b), Table 4.1. 
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Illustrative List of Developmental Subjects (Other Than Financial Subjects) Included in 
the Union, State, and Concurrent Lists in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution 
 






1  6  Atomic energy and mineral resources necessary for its production 
2 22  Railways 
3.  23  Highways declared by or under law made by Parliament to be national highways 
4.  24  Shipping and navigation on inland waterways, declared by Parliament by law to be national waterways, as 
regards mechanically propelled vessels the rule of the road on such waterways. 
5.  25  Maritime shipping and navigation including shipping and navigation on tidal waters provision of 
education and training for the mercantile marine and regulation of such education and training provided 
by States and other agencies. 
6.  26  Lighthouses, lightships, beacons and other provision for the safety of shipping and aircraft. 
7.  27  Ports declared by or under law made by Parliament or existing law to be major ports, including their 
delimitation and the constitution and powers of port authorities therein. 
8.  28  Port quarantine, including hospitals connected therewith seamen's and marine hospitals. 
9.  29  Airways aircraft and air-navigation provision of aerodromes; regulation and organisation of air traffic and 
of aerodromes; provision for aeronautical education and training and regulation of such education and 
training provided by States and other agencies. 
10.  30  Carriage of passengers and goods by railways, sea or air, or by national waterways in mechanically 
propelled vessels. 
11.  31  Posts and telegraph: telephones, wireless, broadcasting and other form of communications. 
12.  41  Trade and commerce with foreign countries; import and export across customs frontiers; definition of 
customs frontiers. 
13.  42  Inter-State trade and commerce. 
14.  52  Industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by parliament by law to be expedient in the 
public interest. 
15.  53  Regulation and development of oilfields and mineral oil resources; petroleum and petroleum products; 
other liquids and substances declared by Parliament by law to be dangerously inflammable. 
16.  54  Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent which such regulation and development under 
the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest. 
17.  56  Regulation and development of inter-State rivers and river valleys to the extent to which such regulation 
and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the 
public interest. 
18.  57  Fishing and fisheries beyond territorial waters. 
19.  65  Union agenda and institutions for - 
a.  professional, vocational or technical training including the training of police officers; or 
b.  the promotion of special studies or research; or 
c.  scientific or technical assistance in the investigation or detection of crime. 
20.  66  Coordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific 
and technical institutions. 
21.  68  Survey of India, the geological, botanical, zoological and anthropological surveys of India, meteorological 
organizations. 
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(B) State List 
S.  No.  Entry 
No. 
Subject  
1  5  Local government, that is to say, the constitution and powers of municipal corporations, 
improvements trusts, district boards, mining settlement authorities and other local authorities for 
the purpose of local self-government or village administration. 
2  6  Public health and sanitation; hospitals and dispensaries 
3.  9  Relief of the disabled and unemployable. 
4.  13  Communications, that is to say, roads, bridges, ferries, and other means of communication not 
specified in List I: municipal tramways; ropeways;  inland waterways and traffic thereon subject 
to the provisions of List I and List II with regard to such waterways; vehicles other than 
mechanically propelled vehicles. 
5.  14  Agriculture, including agricultural education and research, protection against pests  and 
prevention of plant diseases. 
6.  15  Preservation, protection and improvement of stock and prevention of animal diseases; 
veterinary training and practice. 
7.  17  Water, that is to say, water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage, embankments, water 
storage and water power subject to the provisions of entry 56 of List I. 
8.  18  Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relations of landlord and 
tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement 
and agricultural loans; colonization. 
9. 21  Fisheries 
10.  23  Regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to 
regulation and development under the control of the Union. 
11.  24  Industries subject to the provisions of entries 7 and 52 of List I. 
12. 25  Gas  and  gas-works 
13.  26  Trade and commerce within the State subjects to the provisions of entry 33 of List III. 
14.  27  Production, supply and distribution of goods subject to the provisions of entry 33 of List III. 
15. 32  Cooperative  societies 
16.  35  Works, lands and buildings vested in or in the possession of the State. 
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(C) Concurrent List 
S.  No.  Entry 
No. 
Subject  
1 17A  Forests 
2.  20  Economic and social planning 
3.  20A  Population control and family planning 
4.  23  Social security and social insurance; employment and unemployment 
5.  25  Education, including technical education, medical education and universities, subject to the 
provisions of entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I; vocational and technical training of labor. 
6.  27  Relief and rehabilitation of persons displaced from their original place of residence by reasons of the 
setting up of the Dominions of India and Pakistan. 
7.  31  Ports other than those declared by or under law made by Parliament or existing law to be major 
ports. 
8.  32  Shipping and navigation and inland waterways as regards mechanically propelled vessels, and the 
rule of the road on such waterways, and the carriage of passengers and goods on inland waterways 
subject to the provisions of List I with regard to national waterways. 
9.  33  Trade and commerce in, and the production supply and distribution of - 
a.     the products of any industry where the control of such industry by the Union is  
       declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest and imported               
goods on inland waterways subject to the provisions of List I with regard to national           
waterways. 
b.      foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils; 
c.      cattle fodder, including oilseeds and other concentrates; 
d.      raw cotton, where ginned or unginned and cotton seed; and 
e.      raw jute. 
10. 36  Factories 
11. 37  Boilers 
12. 38  Electricity 
 
 
Source: Rao and Singh (2004b) 
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Taxation Heads Assigned to the Union and the States in the Constitution, as Listed in the 




List I  
Head Entry  in 
List II 
Head 
82  Taxes on income other than agricultural income  45  Land revenue, including the assessment and 
collection of revenue, the maintenance  of land 
records, survey for revenue purposes. 
83  Duties of customs including export duties  46  Taxes on agricultural income 
84  Duties of excise on tobacco and other goods 
manufactured or produced in India except- 
a.  alcoholic liquors for human consumption; 
b.  opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs 
and narcotics; but including medicinal and           
toilet preparations containing alcohol or any 
substance included in sub-paragraph (b) of this 
entry. 
47  Duties in respect of succession of agricultural land 
85  Corporation tax  48  Estate duty in respect of agricultural land 
86  Taxes on the capital value of the assets, exclusive 
of agricultural land of individuals and companies; 
taxes on the capital of companies 
49  Taxes on lands and buildings 
87  Estate duty in respect of property other than 
agricultural land. 
50  Taxes on mineral rights subject to any limitations 
imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral 
development 
88  Duties in respect of succession to property other 
than agricultural land  
51  Duties of excise on the following goods 
manufactured or produced in the State and 
countervailing duties at the same or lower rates on 
similar goods manufactured or produced elsewhere 
in India: 
a.  alcohol liquors for human consumption; 
b.  opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and 
narcotics; but not including medicinal and toilet 
preparations containing alcohol or any substance       
included in sub-paragraph (b) of this entry.   
89  Terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by 
railway, sea or air: taxes on railway fares and 
freights. 
52  Taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for 
consumption, use or sale therein. 
90  Taxes other than stamp duties on transactions in 
stock exchanges and future markets 
53  Taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity 
91  Rates of stamp duty in respect of bills of 
exchange cheques promisory notes, bills of 
lading, letters of credit, policies of insurance, 
transfer of shares, debentures, proxies and 
receipts. 
@54  Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than 
newspapers, subject to the provisions of entry 92A 
of List I. 
92  Taxes on the sale or purchase of newspapers and 
on advertisements published therein. 
55  Taxes on advertisements other than advertisements 
published in the newspaper @@ and advertisements 
broadcast by radio or television. 
  22*92A  Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than 
newspapers, where such sale or purchase takes 
place in the course of inter-State trade or 
commerce. 
56  Taxes on goods and passengers carried by road or 
on inland waterways. 
**92B  Taxes on the consignment of goods (whether the 
consignment is to the person making it or to any 
other person), where such consignment takes 
place in the course of inter-State trade or 
commerce. 
57  Taxes on vehicles, whether mechanically propelled 
or not, suitable for use on roads including tramcars, 
subject to the provision of entry 35 of List III. 
97  Any other matter not enumerated in  List II or 
List III including any tax   not mentioned in either 
or both the Lists. 
58  Taxes on animals and boats 
   59  Tolls 
    60  Taxes on professions, trades, callings and 
employments 
   61  Capitation  taxes 
    62  Taxes on luxuries, including taxes on      
entertainments, amusements, betting and gambling.  
    63  Rates of stamp duty in respect of documents other 
than those specified in the provision of List I with 
regard to rates of stamp duty. 
 
Notes: * Ins.  by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956 s.2; ** Ins.  by the Constitution (Forty-sixth 
Amendment) Act, 1982, s.5; @ Sub.  by the Constitution (sixth Amendment) Act 1956, s.2 for entry 54; @@ Ins.  
by the Constitution (Forth-second Amendment) Act, 1975, s.57 (w.e.f.  31.1.1977) 
 
Source: Rao and Singh (2004b) 
  23Table 4 
Criteria and Relative Weights for Tax Devolution 
 
Criterion Weight  (Percent) 
1.  Population (1971 Census)  10 
2.  Income (Distance Method)*  62.5 
3.  Area  7.5 
4.  Index of Infrastructure  7.5 
5.  Tax Effort**  5.0 
6.  Fiscal Discipline***  7.5 
 
Notes: *The distance method is given by:  (Yh-Yi)Pi/Σ(Yh-Yi)Pi   where, where Yi and Yh represent per capita SDP of 
the i
th and the highest income State respectively and Pi is the population of the i
th State . 
** Tax Effort (η) is estimated as (η) = (Ti / Yi) / (0.5 1/Yi) where, Ti is the per capita tax revenue collected by the i
th 
State and Yi is the per capita State domestic product of the i
th State. 
*** Estimated as the improvement in the ratio of own revenue of a state to its revenue expenditures divided by a 
similar ratio for all States averaged for the period 1966-99 over 1991-1993. 
 
Source: Rao and Singh (2004b) 
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High Income States  22461  17.83  2931.6  13.1  500  4386.6 66.8 
Gujarat 18685  14.07  2684.6  13.2  863  5167.6 52.0 
Goa 44613  4.4  14310.3  15.8  588  11904.8 120.2 
Haryana 21551  8.74  3209.7  12.1  502  4107.9 78.1 
Maharashtra 22604  25.02  2741.3  11.1  448  3852.6 71.2 
Punjab 23254  6.16  3333.2  10.2  494  4712.7 70.7 
Middle Income States  17635  20.3  1868.8  10.6  658  3400.4 55.0 
Andhra Pradesh  14878  15.77  1930.2  10.7  713  3320.2 58.1 
Karnataka 16654  20.44  2148.1  11.3  686  3580.9 60.0 
Kerala 17709  12.72  2295.8  10.2  690  3689.4 62.2 
Tamil Nadu  18623  21.12  2342.5  11.3  658  3594.3 65.2 
West Bengal  14874  27.02  1091.0  5.5  576  3092.7 35.3 
Low Income States  9013  34.28  846.8  9.4  673  2243.4 37.7 
Bihar 4813  42.6  338.2  8.9  724  1515.5 22.3 
Chattisgarh 10405  NA  1264.0  4.9  NA  2455.2 51.5 
Jharkhand 9223  NA  1128.0  9.0  NA  2229.4 50.6 
Madhya Pradesh  11626  37.43  1061.9  11.5  624  2695.5 39.4 
Orissa 8733  47.15  900.5  9.3  969  2785.3 32.3 
Rajasthan 13046  15.28  1297.2  10.4  693  2864.2 45.3 
Uttaranchal NA  NA  1295.5  NA  NA  4912.7 26.4 
Uttar Pradesh  9323  31.15  791.2  8.1  598  2135.6 37.0 
General Cat.  States  14476  25.97  1594.0  11.0  660  3045.3 52.3 
Special Cat.  States  12339    1155.9  9.4  2896  5715.4 20.2 
Arunachal Pradesh  13352  33.47  1067.8  5.3  7985  9992.3 10.7 
Assam 9720  36.09  798.7  7.2  1216  3317.0 24.1 
Himachal Pradesh  17786  7.63  1660.5  7.8  3070  7420.6 22.4 
Jammu & Kashmir  12373  3.48  1150.4  7.9  4602  6080.0 18.9 
Manipur 12721  28.54  406.0  3.1  3971  6032.3 6.7 
Meghalaya 12063  33.87  1066.8  6.3  3149  5878.4 18.1 
Mizoram 14909  19.47  679.0  3.8  9602  12845.6 5.3 
Nagaland 12594  32.67  506.8  3.7  6332  7291.0 7.0 
Sikkim 14751  36.55  5998.1  15.9  7945  12200.6 49.2 
Tripura 13195  34.44  729.6  4.8  3376  5838.9 12.5 
All States  14359  26.1  1570.1  10.9  768  3191.1 49.2 
 
Source: Rao and Singh (2004b) 
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Fourth  Plan  45.60  8.60 54.20  10.80 9.70 20.50 9.30 83.90 
(1969-74) (54.35)  (10.25)  (64.60)  (12.87) (11.56) (24.43) (11.08)  (100.00) 
Fifth  Plan  82.70  28.20  110.90  29.10 19.30 48.40  5.40 164.70 
(1974-79) (50.21)  (17.12)  (67.33)  (17.67) (11.72) (29.39)  (3.28) (100.00) 
Sixth  Plan  237.30  21.40 258.70 73.80  69.00 142.80 15.10 416.50 
(1980-85) (56.97)  (5.14)  (62.11)  (17.72) (16.57) (34.29)  (3.63) (100.00) 
Seventh  Plan  494.60  62.70  557.40 155.20 165.10 320.30  35.20  913.10 
(1985-90) (54.17)  (6.87)  (61.04)  (17.00) (18.08) (35.08)  (3.85) (100.00) 
Annual  Plan    172.00  34.50 206.40 57.20  55.40 112.50 10.20 329.40 
1991-92 (52.22)  (10.47)  (62.66)  (17.36) (16.82) (34.15)  (3.10) (100.00) 
Eighth  Plan  1318.50 147.20  1465.70  483.40 364.70 848.40  58.40 2373.10 
(1992-97) (55.56)  (6.20)  (61.76)  (20.37) (15.37) (35.75)  (2.46) (100.00) 
1997-98  404.11  16.80 420.91  120.08 67.56 187.64 37.80 646.35 
   (62.52)  (2.60)  (65.12)  (18.58) (10.45) (29.03)  (5.85) (100.00) 
1998-99  394.20  14.20 408.40  132.70 71.10 203.80 20.60 632.80 
   (62.29)  (2.24)  (64.54)  (20.97) (11.24) (32.21)  (3.26) (100.00) 
1999-00  441.21  19.88 461.09  163.16 82.03 245.19 41.14 747.42 
   (59.03)  (2.66)  (61.69)  (21.83) (10.98) (32.80)  (5.50) (100.00) 
2000-01  RE  518.27  121.69 639.96 157.59 136.76 294.35  56.99  991.30 
 (52.28)  (12.28)  (64.56)  (15.90)  (13.80) (29.69)  (5.75) (100.00) 
2001-02  BE  603.5  95.34  698.84 190.67 152.52 343.19  47.04 1089.07 
 (55.41)  (8.75)  (64.17)  (17.51)  (14.00) (31.51)  (4.32) (100.00) 
 
 
Notes: RE: Revised Estimates, BE: Budget Estimates 
Source: Rao and Singh (2004b) 
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B.   Non-special category States  
 
     (i)   Population (1971) 
     (ii)  Per capita income, of which 
           (a)  According to the ‘deviation’ 
                method covering only the 
                States with per capita 
                income below the national  
                average 
 
           (b)  According to the `distance' 
                method covering all the  
                non-special category states 
                 
     (iii) Fiscal performance, 
           of which 
           (a)  Tax effort  
           (b)  Fiscal management 
           (c)  National objectives 
 
      (iv) Special problems 
 































Notes:  1. The formula is as revised in December, 1991; 2. Fiscal management is assessed as the difference 
between States' own total plan resources estimated at the time of finalizing annual plan and their actual performance, 
considering latest five years; 3. Under the criterion of the performance in respect of certain programs of national 
priorities the approved formula covers four objectives, viz.  (i) population control, (ii) elimination of illiteracy, (iii) 
on-time completion of externally aided projects, and (iv) success in land reforms. 
 
Source: Rao and Singh (2004b) 